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CURRENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-EMERGENcY-LIABILITY OF MASTER EsTAB-
LISHED BY EmPLOYaa's REQUEST FOR HELP.-The plaintiff, a boy of fourteen,
brought an action for personal injuries received while assisting other persons to
hold a very heavy box on the end of the defendant's truck. There was conflict-
ing testimony as to whether the driver requested the plaintiff's assistance. Held,
that if the jury found, on the question properly submitted to them, that the plain-
tiff in fact was acting in compliance with a request of the driver, then the existing
emergency justified the latter in so employing him, but that in such circumstances
the defendant was under a duty to instruct the plaintiff. Lipari v. Bush Terminal
Co. (192o, N. Y.) 193 App. Div. 309.
The existence of an emergency in the defendant's affairs operated to establish
the relation of master and servant between himself and the plaintiff irrespective
of his consent. The master owes a duty to warn and instruct an infant servant,
which is usually capable of being delegated. As no attempt was made to show
such a delegation, it would seem that the defendant was correctly held liable for
his own negligence. See (192o) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 85.
AGENCY-WoRKMEN'S ComPENSATIoN-ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT-INJURY RECEIVED ON STEPS OF CANTEEN PROVIDED BY
EMPLoYER.-The plaintiff, a girl munitions worker, was employed by the week in
a factory where it was required that all employees leave the grounds for an hour
at noontime. While returning to work after the noon recess, the plaintiff slipped
and fell on the steps of a canteen conducted by the defendants for the exclusive
use of their employees. The canteen was situated within the factory enclosure,
but it was necessary to go upon the public street in order to gain access to it.
For the injury thus received the plaintiff sought to recover compensation from
her employer. Held, that compensation must be allowed on, the ground that the
plaintiff was using the means of access provided by her employer from the can-
teen to her work. Lords Finlay and Dunedin, dissenting. Armstrong, Whit-
worth, & Co. v. Redford [I92O] A. C. 757.
This case seems to extend the modern American doctrine. See L. R. A. igi8F,
907.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.-A
statute of Michigan forbade street railway companies to require motormen and
conductors to work more than six days per week, except in certain emergencies.
The plaintiff, a non-union conductor, brought an action against the company for
a declaration that he was privileged to work more than six days a week. A
labor union intervened as defendant, and a declaration was' given in favor of
the plaintiff in the lower court. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional,
because it imposed on the court non-judicial duties. Sharpe, J., dissenting.
Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. (I92O, Mich.) 179 N. W. 350.
See COMMENTS, supra, p,. 161.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POVER-VALIDITY OF RESTRICTIVE BUILDING OR-
DINANCE.-The plaintiff brought a bill in equity to compel the specific perform-
ance of a contract to purchase land. The defense was set up that the property
was encumbered by a so-called zoning resolution passed pursuant to Laws of
New York 1916, ch. 497, which amended the charter of the city of New -York and
gave to the board of estimate the power to pass resolutions regulating and limit-
ing the height and bulk of buildings to be erected, determining the areas of courts,
yards, and other spaces, and regulating and restricting the location of trades and
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industries and establishing the boundaries of districts for such purposes. Held,
that the resolution was valid and did not constitute an encumbrance on the land.
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp. (1920) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 2o9.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 171.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-VALIDITY OF RESTRIcTr BUILDING OR-
DINANcE.-Acting under the authority of its charter the borough of Fenwick
passed an ordinance requiring of every one to secure a permit from the warden
and burgesses before erecting any building in the borough limits. The plaintiff
held fishing rights in certain property bordering on Long Island Sound and
erected a fish-house upon it without first securing a permit. The borough officials
gave him reasonable warning to remove the house, and upon his failure to do so
had it removed at a moderate cost. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief and
damages. Held, that the ordinance Was invalid as an unreasonable exercise of
the police power. Ingham v. Brooks (ig2o, Conn.) III Atl. 2o9.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 171
CONTRACTS-INDEFINITE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT.-The plaintiff agreed to carry
the defendant from her home to school at a certain fixed sum per month, specify-
ing no length of time for which the contract should run. The defendant, without
notice, discharged the plaintiff during the month and the plaintiff sought to re-
cover a whole month's salary. Held, that the plaintiff could n6t recover, since a
hiring which neither expressly or impliedly specified the' time which it was to run
was a hiring for an indefinite time and could be terminated at will by either party.
DeBolt J., dissenting. Crawford v. Stewart (1919, C. C. Ist) 25 Haw. 226.
The instant case is in accord with the great weight of authority in the United
States. Martin, v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1895) 148 N. Y. 117, 42 N. E. 416; Christ-
eisen v. Pacific Coast Borax Co. (1894) 26 Ore. 302, 38 Pac. 127. Williston dis-
approves of the American view and holds with the English courts that such a
contract is a contract for the period specified for payment. I Williston, Contracts
(i92o) sec. 39; Moult v. Holliday [1898] i Q. B. 125; Levy v. Goldhill [1917]
2Ch. 297.
CRIMINAL LAw-SPECIFIC INTENT IN STATUTORY ASSAULTS-MISTAKEN IDEN-
TITY AND MISTAKEN Aim.-One Costa quarreled With a fellow-employee named
Williams, and threatened to fight it out with hiim, even if one of them should be
killed. On the evening of the next day Costa attacked one Clark, a man of about
the same height as Williams, under circumstances that suggested that he had
mistaken Clark for Williams. Clark was severely slashed, and an information
was brought against Costa, charging him with an intent to assault Clark, under
a maiming statute requiring an intent to maim the person injured. Held, that
the information was properly drawn. State v. Costa (i92o, Conn.) IIO Atl. 875.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 184.
EQUITY-NUISANCE-UNDERTAKING ESTABLISHMENT IN RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT
ENJOINE.-A "Funeral Home" was established in an exclusive residential dis-
trict of Omaha in spite of the objections of the residents. Sermons, and dirges
in the adjoining chapel, blocking'up the street, and the depressing atmosphere
created, together with a corresponding depreciation in real estate values, were the
grounds for the petition. The defendant appealed. Held, that the injunction
was properly granted. Beisel v. Crosby (192o, Neb.) 178 N. W. 272.
An undertaker's establishment is not a nuisance per se, but the case seems
sound because of the depreciation in value of neighboring property. L. R. A.
1918 A, 829. For decision of a morgue case, see (I919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
366.
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GARNISHMENT-CONTENTS OF SAFETY DEmosrr Box ARE SUBJECT To wir.-The
plaintiff obtained a court order, pursuant to the service of a writ of garnishment,
directing a trust company, as garnishee, to open the safety deposit box of the de-
fendant and deliver its contents to the sheriff, who should take such of the defend-
ant's property as was liable to garnishment. The trust company refused to comply
with the order. To open the box the company would have had to use force, no
key being available but that of the defendant, who could not be reached. Held,
that the court had the power to require the garnishee to open the box. West
Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson et at. (Zion's Saving's Bank & Trust Co., gar-
nishee) (I92O, Utah) igo Pac. 946.
This appears tobe well within the limits of the Utah Statute. 1917 Comp. Laws
sec. 6730, amended 1gg Laws of Utah, 344. The weight of authority would seem
to be in accord with the principal case. Tillinghast v. Johnson (1912) 34 R. I.
136, 82 AtI. 788, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 764. Authorities contra are cited in 20
Cyc. 1022.
PERSONS-ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-BENEFICIARIES UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH
Acrs.-An action was brought by the state for the death of a woman, one of the
beneficiaries being her illegitimate child. It was necessary to decide whether an
illegitimate child could recover under the Maryland statute, in order to ascertain
the relevancy of certain evidence. Held, that an illegitimate child could not
recover, as the word "child" when used in a statute prima facie means legitimate
child. Washington, B. & A. Ry. v. State (192o, Md.) ii Aftl. 164.
See COMmENTS, supra, p. 167.
PERSONS-VALIDITY OF A COMMON-LA.w MARRIAGE UNDER A STATUTE.-The
plaintiff brought suit for the annulment of a marriage, because the defendant's
first husband was living at the time it was consummated. Several years later the
defendant obtained a divorce from her first husband and the plaintiff, knowing
this, lived with her for sixteen years afterwards. A statute required a license
for the validity of a marriage. The defendant obtained an interlocutory decree
in the lower court, awarding her alimony pendente lite, because a common-law
marriage is prima facie valid. Held, (three judges dissenting) 'that the decree
should be affirmed. Sims v. Sims (192o, Miss.) 85 So. 73.
Two questions are presented in the instant case, in view of the statute: (I)
whether the cohabitation for sixteen years has resulted in a common-law mar-
riage; (2) whether the statute admits the possibility of such a marriage. It has
frequently been held in these circumstances that cohabitation after the impediment
is removed results in a common-law marriage. See COMMENTS (1916) 26 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 145; (1917) 27 id. 702. Unless the words of the statute expressly
declares a common-law marriage void, it is valid prima facie. (1916) I5 MICH.
L. REv. 347.
PLEADING-ELECTION' OF REMEDIES-CHOICE OF ONE OF TWO INCONSISTENT REm-
EDIES BARS THE OTHER.-The intervener had brought an action against the de-
fendant for the conversion of her automobile. Subsequently she dismissed her
action, and now she undertakes to recover possession of her car in specie. The
plaintiff's answer was that by her former action she had elected to treat the auto-
mobile as the property of the defendant and was therefore precluded from prose-
cuting an action for the recovery of the specific property. Held, that the
intervener could not recover. Ireland vr. Waymire et al. (Hill, Intervener)
(192o, Kan.) 191 Pac. 3o4.
Although the weight of authority is probably in accord with the principal case
in holding that, when, with knowledge of the facts, the former owner sues for
the value of the property converted, his election is complete and the other remedy
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is no longer available, yet this doctrine has been severely criticized and appears to
be unsound in theory. For a searching criticism see Keener, Quasi-Contracts
(1893) 203-213. See also, Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (igio)
xg YALE LAW JoURNAL, 221, 239; (gIg) 28 YAME LAW JOURNAL, 409.
TAXATION-INHERTANBz TAx-PRoPERTY BEQUEATHED UNDER PowER OF AP-
POINTMENT NOT TAxABL- AS .PART OF DONR's EsTATE-The plaintiff executor
was forced to pay a sum of money to the tax collector on the transfer of the
estate of the testator under the Federal Estate Tax Act, Sept. 8, 1916, sec. 202.
The tax was levied upon the whole estate, including certain property over which
the testator held a power of appointment from another, who had died before the
passage of the act. The plaintiff claims, that, construed by the laws of Penn-
sylvania, the tax was assessed on the property which passed under the power of
appointment as the estate of the donor, and that this property should not be
taxed as the estate of the donee. Held, that the plaintiff should recover the
amount paid on the property transferred under the power of appointment.
Lederer v. Pearce (I92O, C. C. A. 3d) 266 Fed. 497.
This appears to represent the line of decisions which hold that the creation of
the power of appointment rather than its exercise is considered as the act effect-
ing a taxable transfer. The case illustrates how the federal tax operates differ-
ently in each state, according to the state laws. For a discussion of the principle,
see (igi8) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 92 and authorities there cited. See also Glea-
son & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (I97) 1og, 484.
TORTS-HARBORING AND EMPLOYING A RUNAWAY SERVANT-INVOLUNTARY 
SERVI-
TUDE.-A share cropper in the employ of the plaintiff definitely repudiated his
contract. Later he was employed by the defendant, who had knowledge of the
facts. Held, that the defendant was not guilty of a tort, because a contrary rule
would create an involuntary servitude forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment.
Shaw v. Fisher (i92o, S. C.) io2 S. E. 325.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 174.
